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COVERAGE OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS UNDER THE




p SYCHIATRIC disorders have the unique distinction of being
both prevalent' and stigmatized 2 in our society. Many individu-
als with such disorders, aware of this stigma from personal experi-
ence, face difficult decisions in the workplace. 3 Disclosure of a
disability to a supervisor or employer, often required to invoke the
protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),4
may provoke the very discrimination the ADA is designed to de-
* Ms. Mastroianni is Associate Legal Counsel at the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in Washington, D.C.
** Ms. Miaskoff is Assistant Legal Counsel for Coordination, at the EEOC in
Washington, D.C. This Article was written by Ms. Mastroianni and Ms. Miaskoff in
their private capacities. No official support or endorsement by the EEOC or any
other agency of the U.S. government is intended or should be inferred.
1. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES,
EMPLOYMENT AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 51-52 (1994) [hereinafter
OTA DISABILITY REPORT) (discussing results of survey on mental disorders in
United States). Recent statistics show that more than one of every five American
adults have a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year. Id. With respect to the
major mental disorders, approximately 9% of American adults have mood disor-
ders (bipolar disorder, major depression, dysthymia); approximately 12% have
anxiety disorders (phobic disorders, panic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disor-
der); and approximately 1% have schizophrenia. Id.
2. See Mark Clements, Wat We Say About Mental Illness, PARADE MAG., Oct. 31,
1993, at 4-5 (discussing results of survey and concluding that stigma against mental
illnesses will hopefully be removed during 1990s). Of the 2503 men and women
surveyed in a 1993 poll sponsored by Parade Magazine, 70% said there was a stigma
attached to admitting to a mental illness and 55% felt that the same stigma applied
to seeing a mental health professional. Id. Also, 85% of those surveyed believed
that some people who needed treatment were not seeking it because of the stigma
attached to mental illness. Id.3. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Law School Grad Looks Ahead Despite His Schizophrenia,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 16, 1995, at Bl (discussing stigma from psychriatric
disorders in legal field). Michael Laudor, who has schizophrenia and applied for
law school teaching jobs while he was a postdoctoral associate, recounted how
"[s] ome people at Yale Law School told me not to tell anyone [about my schizo-
phrenia] because mental illness is a career-killer." Id.
In an account of his experience with severe depression, the novelist William
Styron wrote: "Curiously enough, it was [my psychiatrist] who told me once or
twice during our sessions (and after I had hesitantly broached the possibility of
hospitalization) that I should try to avoid the hospital at all costs, owing to the
stigma I might suffer." WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE 67-68 (1990).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Section 12112 states in part:
(723)
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feat.5 A better understanding of psychiatric conditions in general,
and of the ADA's coverage of individuals with psychiatric disabilities
in particular, may help to reduce such discrimination.
Under the ADA, the term "disability" means: "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
jor life activities of ... [an] individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impair-
ment."'6 This Article discusses the application of the definition of
disability to persons with psychiatric disorders.
II. CuRiRENT DISABILITY
A. It Is Often Self-Evident That an Individual Currently Has a
Psychiatric "Disability" Within the Meaning of the ADA
An individual currently has a disability within the meaning of
the ADA if he or she has an "impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities." 7 In many instances, courts
have found it unnecessary to parse this statutory definition in order
to conclude that an individual experiencing a severe psychiatric
condition has a disability.8
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job ap-
plication procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employ-
ees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.
Id. § 12112(a).
5. See LAuRA MANCUso, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PEOPLE WITH
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
TURNING POLICY INTO PRACTICE 5 (1995) (stating that disclosure of disability often
leads to closer scrutiny). According to a Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices report, "[slome mental health consumers report that they are more closely
supervised after they disclose [a disability], even if their job performance is un-
changed. Co-workers may also become less interested in socializing with them."
Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1997) (defin-
ing disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C)). See generally [1993-1997
Transfer Binder] EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 902 (1995) [hereinafter EEOC
Compl. Man.] (defining disability under ADA and describing guidelines used by
EEOC investigators in ADA cases).
The definition of the term disability in the ADA is comparable to that used in
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) and its implementing regula-
tions. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994) (defining disability
under Rehabilitation Act); see also Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 725
(5th Cir. 1995) (finding definition of disability in ADA "substantially equivalent" to
that in Rehabilitation Act). "Congress intended that the relevant case law devel-
oped under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 'disability'
as used in the ADA." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
8. See, e.g., Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1985) (conclud-
ing, without legal analysis, that bipolar disorder treated by lithium is substantially
724 [Vol. 42: p. 723
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The correctness of these judicial judgments is borne out by a
closer examination of diagnostic criteria for certain psychiatric dis-
orders in the context of the ADA's definition of disability. The di-
agnostic criteria of some mental disorders, by their very terms,
describe symptoms that are "substantially limiting" in that they are
both severe and ongoing.9 For example, the diagnosis for schizo-
phrenia is based on findings of two or more acute symptoms for a
significant portion of time during a one-month period (including
delusions, hallucinations, catatonic behavior and disorganized
speech); ongoing functional impairment; and continuous signs of
the disturbance for at least six months, including the period of
acute symptoms, as well as other symptoms such as extreme apathy
and lack of emotion.10 Similarly, the diagnosis for a chronic major
depressive episode is based on a finding of five or more severe
symptoms that are experienced continuously for at least two years. 11
Such symptoms include an intensely sad mood, markedly dimin-
ished interest or pleasure in activities, insomnia or sleeping too
much, and diminished ability to think, concentrate or make deci-
sions.' 2 Other psychiatric conditions, like obsessive-compulsive dis-
order, similarly may rise to the level of a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. 13
Extensive analysis of ADA disability is also unnecessary when an
individual experiences severe symptoms of a mental impairment on
an episodic basis. Some individuals have episodes of a major
mental illness, like bipolar disorders, repeatedly over several
limiting impairment under Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-
Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1408 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding
that plaintiff's depression and repeated suicide attempts were handicaps under
section 504 of Rehabilitation Act); Franklin v. United States Postal Serv., 687 F.
Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (noting, without legal analysis, that paranoid
schizophrenia may be handicap under Rehabilitation Act).
9. See generally, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]
(explaining diagnostic criteria for psychological disorders).
10. See id. at 285-86 (explaining diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia).
11. See id. at 327 (listing criteria for "chronic major depressive episode").
12. See id. at 327, 382 (listing criteria and chronic specifier for "major depres-
sive episode").
13. See id. at 422-23 (discussing criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorders). A
diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder includes obsessions (such as recurrent
and persistent thoughts, impulses or images that are experienced as intrusive and
inappropriate) or compulsions (such as repetitive behaviors like hand washing or
mental acts like repeating words soundlessly), when the obsessions or compulsions
cause marked distress or significantly interfere with the person's normal routine,
occupational functioning, or usual social activities or relationships. Id. In terms of
duration, obsessive-compulsive disorder usually begins in adolescence or early
adulthood and often continues on a chronic course of waxing and waning. Id.
1997]
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months or several years. 14 The course of such an impairment is not
temporary or short-lived, although it may be unpredictable.1 5 The
impairment may substantially limit a major life activity in a variety
of ways, involving periodically acute symptoms as well as severe
medication side effects and other self-limiting efforts designed to
reduce the likelihood or intensity of the next episode. 16 Under
these circumstances, the severity and ongoing nature of the condi-
tion would clearly make it a disability for purposes of the ADA.17
B. Situations in Which More Extensive Analysis Is Required
Of course, there are situations in which it is not readily appar-
ent if an individual has a psychiatric disability within the meaning
of the ADA.18 In these cases, the familiar ADA analysis for deter-
mining whether an individual currently has a disability is applied.
The first step is to determine whether the individual has a "mental
impairment." 19 Then, the next step is to determine whether one or
more major life activities are substantially limited by that
impairment. 20
1. Mental Impairment
The ADA regulations state that the phrase "mental impair-
ment" includes "[a] ny mental or psychological disorder, such as...
14. See id. at 359-63 (discussing criteria for bipolar disorder). The diagnosis
for bipolar disorder with recurrent episodes of major depression and hypomania
involves "clinically significant distress" in important areas of functioning and a con-





18. See Pritchard v. Southern Co. Serv., 92 F.3d 1130, 1133 (lth Cir. 1996)
(finding genuine issue of material fact whether engineer with depression had
symptoms that substantially limited major life activity); Marschand v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (concluding that plaintiffs post-
traumatic-stress disorder undisputedly qualifies as mental impairment, but that it
does not mean plaintiff is disabled under ADA). Recent cases suggest that whether
an individual has a covered disability is generally a factual issue, and courts deter-
mine that issue on a case-by-case basis. See generally Olson v. General Elec. Astros-
pace, 101 F.3d 947, 952 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that to determine if one has
disability under ADA, court must assess whether impairment significantly restricts
one's ability to perform); Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 796-
97 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding plaintiff not disabled under ADA when plaintiff
claimed depression as her disability).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2) (1997). For a discussion of what constitutes a
mental impairment under the ADA, see infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
[Vol. 42: p. 723
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emotional or mental illness." 2' The most straightforward evidence
that an individual has such a mental impairment is documentation
of a diagnosis from the current edition of the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV).22 The DSM-1Vis a compendium of mental disorders that
courts presently recognize 23 and is now widely used by American
mental health professionals for diagnostic and insurance reim-
bursement purposes. 24 Commonly known men'tal disorders include
depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and anxiety disorders
such as posttraumatic-stress disorder and obsessive-compulsive
disorder.
Although the DSM-IV is widely used, it is not the only way for
an individual to show mental, impairment. Some people, because
of concerns about stigma, may choose not to disclose their specific
DSM-IV diagnosis to their employer. Because other forms of evi-
dence may suffice to establish mental impairment, this choice in
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2) (1997).
22. See DSM-IV, supra note 9, at 285-86 (discussing criteria and effects of
mental disorders). "[M] any experts contend that as a practical matter, a [DSM-IV]
diagnosis will be necessary if not sufficient to cross the impairment threshold in
the first prong of the ADA definition." OTA DISABILITY REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-
46.
23. See, e.g. Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., United States Postal Serv., 928 F.
Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 1995) ("[A] court may give weight to a diagnosis of mental
impairment which is described in the [DSM-1V] of the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation ... ."); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp. 794, 803 (E.D. Va.
1992) (describing DSM-1V as "nationally recognized directory of mental illness"),
rev'd on other grounds, 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994); Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 772 F.
Supp. 188, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that "major depressive episode as de-
scribed in the [DSM-1V] constitutes 'mental impairment'" under Rehabilitation
Act), aff'd, 965 F.2d 794 (2d .Cir. 1992).
24. Not all DSM-IVdiagnoses support a finding of mental impairment or disa-
bility under the ADA. For example, DSM-IV covers a variety of sexual behavior
disorders and other disorders like kleptomania and pyromania that Congress ex-
pressly excluded from the ADA's definition of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (b)
(1994). Section 12211 states in part:
[T] he term 'disability' shall not include - (1) transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not re-
sulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal
use of drugs.
Id.
Congress also stated that the term "'individual with a disability' does not in-
clude an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the
covered entity acts on the basis" of that use. Id. § 12210(a).
The DSM-1V also includes conditions such as normal bereavement or
problems with a spouse or child, which are not mental disorders and therefore are
not mental impairments for purposes of the ADA. See DSM-IV, supra note 9, at 684-
85 (discussing symptoms of bereavement).
1997]
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itself is not a reason to automatically exclude these individuals from
the protections of the ADA. Thus, individuals concerned about the
consequences of disclosing a diagnosis may choose to give their em-
ployer a detailed note from a doctor or other mental health profes-
sional explaining, for example, the negative manifestations, severity
and duration of their condition. Such a note-provides circumstan-
tial evidence of an underlying mental impairment, evidence that
has sufficient persuasiveness if it is provided in a detailed and credi-
ble way by a doctor or mental health professional. 25
Individuals who cannot afford or do not have access to services
for mental health assessment and treatment may be unable to pro-
duce either DSM-IV or any other type of medical documentation.
Again, this should not necessarily exclude an individual from ADA
coverage. In some instances, statements from family and colleagues
who are familiar with the individual and the course of his or her
condition may provide persuasive evidence of impairment. For ex-
ample, an explanation from a family member that an individual's
tardiness is attributable to well-established compulsive behaviors
(such as washing their hands precisely fifteen times before and after
riding a public bus) may provide evidence of a mental
impairment. 26
25. See, e.g., Mobley v. Board of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (looking to medical evidence, such as clinical findings, medical opinions or
other medical documentation, to establish whether plaintiff has bona fide physical
impairment). Such documentation is most persuasive if it is written by a doctor or
mental health professional who has treated the individual on an ongoing basis. Id.
26. If an employer wants more definitive evidence of mental impairment and
therefore requires a psychiatric examination or evaluation that is job related and
consistent with business necessity, the employer should pay the entire cost of the
evaluation. Any other approach would ultimately and wrongly result in the ADA
reliably protecting only those with comfortable means or good mental health in-
surance coverage. Although the ADA is silent on the issue of payment for medical
examinations, it recognizes "that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an
inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged... economically...."
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (6).
The ADA allows covered entities to make "preemployment inquiries into the
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2)
(B). Likewise, the ADA prohibits covered entities from requiring a medical exami-
nation or from making inquiries of an employee as to "whether such employee is
an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless
such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity." Id. § 12112(d) (4) (A). See, e.g., Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 868
(9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he ADA does not prohibit the state from requiring [the plain-
tiff] to undergo the requested medical examination."); Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430, 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (recognizing board's duty to iden-
tify people suffering from mental conditions that would severely affect their ability
to practice law, but cautioning that such mental health questioning also must com-
ply with ADA).
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Other people may choose simply to identify their condition in
colloquial terms, such as being "stressed." Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines and case law clearly state
that common personality traits and normal emotional reactions, in-
cluding difficulty in responding to stress, are not, without more, im-
pairments under the ADA.2 7 For some people, however, difficulty
responding to stress in general, or to certain stresses in particular,
may be truly linked to a mental impairment. Therefore, before as-
suming that an individual who complains of stress is not covered by
the ADA, it is important to explore whether the individual has a
mental impairment and, if so, whether his or her difficulty respond-
ing to the stress is actually linked to that impairment.28
27. See Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that poor
judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor impulse control in themselves were not
mental impairments, absent "any particular psychological disease or disorder");
Hindman v. GTE Data Serv., No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 WL 371396, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. June 24, 1994) (concluding "personality traits that are commonplace or char-
acteristics within the 'normal' range are excluded from protection"); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h) (1997) (defining "physical" and "mental impairment" under ADA);
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.2(c) (4) (stating that common personalty
traits, such as poor judgment and irresponsible behavior, are not impairments
under ADA).
28. See, e.g., Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C 94 1557 CEM, 1995 WL
705139, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1995) (finding that clerical worker who, after
being promoted to new department, requested "stress leave" and then reassign-
ment, had depressive and anxiety disorders related to her promotion). This issue
typically arises in the context of a request for reasonable accommodation, for ex-
ample, where an employee asks for a reassignment because of work-related stress
in his or her current position. The issues in such a case are whether the stress is
associated with a mental impairment and whether reassignment would be an effec-
tive accommodation. Id. Both leave and reassignment are types of reasonable ac-
commodation that may be required under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2) (o).
I A reasonable accommodation "is any change in the work environment or in
the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to
enjoy equal employment opportunities." Id. The ADA states that "reasonable ac-
commodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, train-
ing materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpret-
ers, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). See, e.g., Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041,
1049 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Efforts should be made, however, to accommodate an em-
ployee in the position that he or she was hired to fill before reassignment is consid-
ered."); Miranda v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (7th Cir.
1996) ("The ADA does not obligate an employer to provide a disabled employee
every accommodation on his wish list."); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695,
699 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that reassignment under reasonable accommodation
of ADA applies to employees who were already employed when they became dis-
abled); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995)
19971
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2. Major Life Activities
An impairment must substantially limit one or more major life
activities to rise to the level of a disability under the ADA.29 Psychi-
atric impairments may affect major life activities such as learning,
concentrating, thinking, interacting with others, caring for one-
self,30 speaking, performing manual tasks and working. Sleeping 3
and eating are also major life activities that may be significantly af-
fected by a psychiatric impairment. This list, however, is not ex-
haustive.32 Indeed, the ADA's emphasis on case-by-case analysis of
("The ADA defines 'reasonable accommodation' to include restructuring a job,
such as by removing non-essential functions from the job."); Vande Zande v. Wis-
consin, Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that ADA
requires employer to make whatever accommodations reasonably possible in cir-
cumstances so as to allow employee to perform essential functions ofjob); Kuehl v.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 909 F. Supp. 794, 803 (D. Colo. 1995) ("The ADA does not
require that an employer provide the best accommodation possible to a disabled
employee."); Marschand v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528, 1543 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) ("[T]he Railroad's efforts to find [the plaintiff] alternative employment
were more than a reasonable accommodation.").
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g), (i) (1997) (de-
fining "major life activity" under ADA); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.3
("For an impairment to rise to the level of disability, it must substantially limit,
have previously substantially limited, or be perceived as substantially limiting, one
or more of a person's major life activities.").
30. See KAy REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND
MADNESS 3-8 (1995) (recounting author's struggle with manic depression). For
example, the ability to care for oneself may be substantially limited by mania. Id.
The ability to care for oneself may also be limited by depression: "And, always,
everything was an effort. Washing my hair took hours to do, and it drained me for
hours afterward; filling the ice-cube tray was beyond my capacity, and I occasion-
ally slept in the same clothes I had worn during the day because I was too ex-
hausted to undress." Id. at 111. William Styron also described the immobilizing
affects of depression: "[A]fternoons were still the worst, beginning at about three
o'clock, when I'd feel the horror, like some poisonous fogbank, roll in upon my
mind, forcing me into bed. There I would lie for as long as six hours, stuporous
and virtually paralyzed, gazing at the ceiling." STYRON, supra note 3, at 58.
31. See STYRON, supra note 3, at 48 (describing how sleeping can be affected by
psychiatric impairments). William Styron recounts how
[t] he two or three hours of sleep I was able to get at night were always at
the behest of the Halcion [tranquilizer] .... [They] were usually termi-
nated at three or four in the morning, when I stared up into yawning
darkness, wondering and writhing at the devastation taking place in my
mind, and awaiting dawn, which usually permitted me a feverish,
dreamless nap.
Id.
In her diary, Virginia Woolf described the nights when she was sick: "[H] ow I
dry & shrivel: how I lie awake at night longing for rest .... But know that I'm to be
pitchforked up into the light & glare again next day." VIRGINIA WOOLF, THE DIARY
OF VIRGINIA WOOLF 118 (Anne Olivier Bell ed., 1982).
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (listing activities considered major life activities);
see also Pritchard v. Southern Co. Serv., No. CV-94-N-0475-S, 1995 WL 338662, at *7
(N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 1995) ("[T]he non-exhaustive list of 'major life activities' con-
tained [in the regulations] is sufficiently expansive so as to preclude a determina-
[Vol. 42: p. 723
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disability requires the flexibility to identify major life activities that
may not be listed in the EEOC guidelines, but may be significantly
impacted by a particular individual's impairment.33
A common mistake in analyzing psychiatric disabilities under
the ADA is to ask whether an individual is limited in working before
considering whether he or she is limited in any other major life
activity. Working should be analyzed last and only if no other ma-
jor life activity is substantially limited by an impairment. 34 If an in-
dividual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no
determination need be made as to whether the individual is sub-
stantially limited in working.35
tion as a matter of law that the ability to 'function, sleep, concentrate and
communicate' would not be included."), rev'd in part, 92 F.3d 1130 (lth Cir.
1996); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.3(b) (stating that major life activi-
ties listed under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) are not exhaustive and listing thinking, con-
centrating and interaction with others as further examples).
33. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. A § 1630.2(j) ("The ADA... [does] not at-
tempt a 'laundry list' of impairments that are 'disabilities.' The determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diag-
nosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of the impairment
on the life of the individual."). See generally Riel v. Electric Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d
678 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding genuine issue of fact existed whether to regard plain-
tiffs renal failure that lead to fatigue as disability under ADA); Mobley v. Board of
Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (stating because plaintiff has
impairment does not mean plaintiff is disabled under ADA); Shpargel v. Stage &
Co., 914 F. Supp. 1468, 1474 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding that evidence not suffi-
cient to prove plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome substantially limited plaintiff's
ability to perform manual tasks); Marschand, 876 F. Supp. at 1538 (stating that
because plaintiff has mental impairment does not mean plaintiff is disabled under
ADA); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (stating
that insulin-dependent diabetic does not have per se disability under ADA and
"[p]laintiff must come forward with evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact").
The ADA defines the term "disability," for each of its subparts, "with respect to
the individuaL" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added). The statute also specifi-
cally states that the underlying impairment must substantially limit a major life
activity "of such individuaL" Id. (emphasis added).
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) ("If an individual is not substantially limited with
respect to any other major life activity, then one should consider whether the indi-
vidual is substantially limited in working."); see also Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods,
Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding genuine issue whether plaintiff
was substantially limited in breathing made it unnecessary to consider other factors
relating to substantial limitation in plaintiffs work).
35. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.4(c) (2)- ("[O]ne need not
determine whether an impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to
work if the impairment substantially limits another major life activity.").
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3. Substantial Limitation
An impairment must substantially limit a major life activity to
rise to the level of a disability under the ADA.36 "Substantial limita-
tion" is evaluated in terms of both severity and duration.3 7 An im-
pairment is sufficiently severe to rise to the level of a disability if it
prevents an individual from performing a major life activity or sig-
nificantly restricts performance of a major life activity as compared
to the average person in the general population.3 8 While tempo-
rary, nonchronic restrictions are generally not substantially limit-
ing, an impairment does not have to be permanently limiting to be
a disability. A severe condition whose duration is indefinite or un-
knowable and that has lasted or is expected to last at least several
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Pritchard, 1995 WL 338662, at *7 (stating
that impairment "does not rise to the level of a 'disability' unless it substantially
limits a major life activity"); Marschand, 876 F. Supp. at 1538 (stating that plaintiff
must also show that mental impairment substantially limits one of plaintiff's major
life activities to be disabled under ADA). See generally Mobley, 924 F. Supp. at 1186-
87 (concluding that plaintiff did not prove she was substantially limited in one or
more major life activities); Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 797
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[Plaintiff] must demonstrate that [her depression] substantially
limited her ability to work at not only her then existing job, but any job."); Coghlan,
851 F. Supp. at 814 (referring to "substantially limits" prong as "constituent ele-
ment" under ADA claim).
37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (defining "substantially limits" under ADA). The
regulations define the term "substantially limits" as follows:
(1) The term 'substantially limits' means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the aver-
age person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected perma-
nent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
Id. See generally EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.4 (defining "substantially
limits" as "comparative term that implies a degree of severity and duration").
38. See, e.g.-, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (defining "substantially limits" and listing
factors to be considered). Note that multiple impairments, standing alone, may
not be severe, but if combined may substantially limit a major life activity. See
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.4(e) ("An individual may have two or
more impairments that are not substantially limiting by themselves but ... to-
gether substantially limit one or more major life activities [and would be a
disability].").
732 [Vol. 42: p. 723
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months rises to the level of a disability under the ADA.39 Moreover,
a combination of impairments, mental or physical, that when taken
together are severe and long-term (or expected to last at least sev-
eral months), may also qualify as an ADA disability.40
With the increasingly successful and widespread use of medica-
tions to treat psychiatric impairments, it is important to understand
how the positive and negative effects of medication are assessed
when analyzing substantial limitation under the ADA.41 First and
most importantly, substantial limitation should be assessed without
regard to mitigating measures, including medications that control
symptoms of the underlying impairment.4 2 Thus, an individual
who takes medication to control the effects of a psychiatric impair-
ment has an ADA disability if there is evidence that the impairment,
when left untreated or without effective medication, substantially
limits a major life activity. Any other approach would wrongly dis-
courage people from maintaining their medication regimens, and
would incorrectly exclude people from the ADA's coverage even
though they actually have ongoing and severe impairments.
Second, although the positive effects of medication should not
be considered when analyzing ADA disability, the negative side ef-
fects of some medications may be substantially limiting in them-
39. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.4(d) (stating that conditions
whose duration are unknown or indefinite rise to level of disability as long as they
are severe).
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (listing factors, such as nature and severity of
impairment, duration and long-term impact of impairment, to be considered in
determining whether individual is substantially limited in major life activity). But
see Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to
evaluate individual's bladder cancer and subsequent depression as one disability
and finding, instead, that because depression lasted less than four months, dura-
tion was insufficient to constitute disability under ADA).
41. See, e.g., Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1994) (con-
sidering side effects of anti-depressant medication and holding that plaintiff had
disability); Fehr v. McLean Packaging Corp., 860 F. Supp. 198, 200 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(considering side effects of medication and concluding that there was factual issue
whether plaintiff was substantially limited in breathing).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 451; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); see also Canon v. Clark, 883 F.
Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that positive effects of medication must
be disregarded when determining whether individual has disability under ADA);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) ("The existence of an impairment is to be determined with-
out regard to mitigating measures such as medicines or prosthetic devices."). But
see Kodowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 798 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (hold-
ing that plaintiff's depression did not substantially limit her ability to work under
ADA when plaintiff was taking antidepressant medication that caused drowsiness);
Mackie v. Runyon, 804 F. Supp. 1508, 1510-11 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that bipo-
lar disorder stabilized with medication does not constitute handicap under section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act).
19971
11
Mastroianni and Miaskoff: Coverage of Psychiatric Disorders under the Americans with Disabi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
selves.43 These negative side effects should be considered when
deciding whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity. 44 Thus, if an individual with major depression takes
medication that causes severe morning grogginess, this side effect
should be considered along with the underlying symptoms of major
depression when determining whether this person has a disability
for purposes of the ADA.
Finally, when medication clearly alleviates the symptoms of an
individual's psychiatric impairment, the tasks of evaluating the se-
verity of the person's limitations and of establishing a link between
those limitations and the impairment itself is relatively straightfor-
ward. For example, suppose an individual who has had posttrau-
matic-stress disorder for several months did not sleep for more than
one hour each night without medication, but now sleeps five or six
hours with medication. He or she uses a medication known to alle-
viate symptoms of posttraumatic-stress disorder including severe
anxiety and wakefulness. Without consideration of the corrective
effects of this medication, it is obvious that this individual's sleeping
pattern (one hour per night) is significantly restricted when com-
pared to the average person's sleeping pattern in the general popu-
lation. Moreover, the fact that this medication has ameliorated his
or her severe sleep problems supports the conclusion that the sleep
problems are, in fact, linked to the posttraumatic-stress disorder.
The use of medication, however, does not always mean that an
individual's underlying impairment is sufficiently severe to rise to
the level of a disability under the ADA.45 For example, an individ-
ual who often sleeps lightly may take a mild tranquilizer to help stay
asleep. Without this tranquilizer, however, the individual's sleep.
may be slightly, but not significantly restricted as compared to that
of the average person in the general population. 46 Accordingly,
43. SeeJAmSON, supra note 30, at 161 (stating that lithium carbonate, taken to
control the effects of bipolar disorder, can make it seem as if sights and sounds
"[have] been filtered through thick layers of gauze"). Describing the effect of his
antipsychotic medication for schizophrenia, Michael Laudor told a reporter: "I
feel that I'm pawing through walls of cotton and gauze when I talk to you now."
Foderaro, supra note 3, at B11.
44. See Guice-Mills, 967 F.2d at 797 (finding that nurse had disability under
Rehabilitation Act where her mental illness and antidepressant drug therapy inter-
fered with her ability to arrive at work on time).
45. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.5 ("[T]he mere use of a miti-
gating measure does not automatically indicate the presence of a disability.").
46. See, e.g., Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 952 (3d Cir.
1996) (stating that to determine if one has disability under ADA, court must assess
whether impairment significantly restricts one's ability to perform); Mobley v.
Board of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (assessing substantial
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this individual would not have a disability within the meaning of the
ADA.
Regardless of medication, sometimes the evidence plainly
shows that a limitation is not severe or is not attributable to a
mental impairment.47 Suppose an individual has a mental impair-
ment, but the only symptom is that the individual has trouble con-
centrating when tired. In this situation, it may be fairly easy to
establish that the individual does not experience restrictions that
are significantly more severe than those experienced by the average
person in the general population. In other cases, it may be appar-
ent that an individual's functional limitations are not attributable to
the alleged mental impairment. For example, if an individual's
only substantial limitation is in working, and if this clearly results
from a lack of job training rather than a mental impairment, then
the individual would not have a disability.
In more complex cases, evaluating the issue of substantial limi-
tation may require a few steps. First, the major life activity affected
by the mental impairment may not be immediately apparent, espe-
cially if an individual describes extreme moods or other difficulties
that are not clearly linked to a familiar major life activity. In such
instances, an effort must be made to identify which major life activi-
ties are implicated by the person's problems. Suppose an individ-
ual describes sad and/or elevated moods, but does not identify
quantifiable sleep problems or associate his or her moods with diffi-
culty performing any other daily activities. In this situation, the ma-
jor life activity of caring for oneself, both in terms of physical self-
care and making responsible judgments, may be significantly im-
pacted by the individual's extreme moods.
Second, the process of assessing substantial limitation obvi-
ously involves gathering information about the severity and dura-
tion of the limitation and about any indications that the limitation
is associated with the impairment. Ultimately, however, this process
depends on making a fair and informed judgment about how these
limitation prong of ADA requires court to "inquire whether the individual is signif-
icantly restricted in the ability" to perform "class ofjobs" or "broad range ofjobs");
Sweet v. Electronic Data Sys., No. 95 Civ. 3987 (MBM), 1996 WL 204471, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1996) ("[T]he ADA protects only a limited class of persons-
individuals who suffer from impairments significantly more severe than those en-
countered by the average person in every day life.").
47. See, e.g., Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790, 798-99
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that any depression plaintiff suffered did not sub-
stantially limit her ability to work based upon professional opinion); Muller v. Au-
tomobile Club, 897 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no evidence that
plaintiff's psychological problems rose to level of disability).
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limitations compare to the abilities of the average person in the
general population. 48 Such a judgment requires open-mindedness
in acknowledging the severity of some psychiatric symptoms and
the willingness to differentiate these limitations from "normal"
emotional problems that the average person may experience in
daily life (such as problems with a spouse or child). In making such
determinations, it is important to recognize and set aside one's own
prejudices about mental illness and about obtaining mental health
treatment. 49 If these prejudices are not set aside, decisions about
ADA disabilities may be skewed, either by assuming disability where
it does not exist or by refusing to acknowledge that an individual's
limitations may, in fact, be manifestations of psychiatric impair-
ments rather than "normal" emotions.
III. REcoRD OF A SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING IMPAIRMENT
The second part of the statutory definition of disability under
the ADA applies to individuals who have a record of a substantially
limiting impairment.50 Because the very disclosure of psychiatric
conditions may prompt a negative reaction, this part of the defini-
tion of disability is particularly important. It covers individuals with
a history of disability who may have recovered totally or at least suf-
ficiently so that their impairment is no longer substantially limit-
ing.51 This second part of the definition of disability also covers
and protects people who have been misdiagnosed as having a sub-
48. See, e.g., Mobley, 924 F. Supp. at 1186 ("[T]he court must inquire whether
the individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range ofjobs in various classes as compared to the average person
with comparable training, skills and abilities.").
49. See Foderaro, supra note 3, at Bl (describing how most people view
mental illness as "career-killer").
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B) (1994). Compare Olson, 101 F.3d at 953 (find-
ing plaintiff did not have record of impairment even though plaintiff was hospital-
ized because plaintiff did not show impairment substantially limited major life
activity), and Mobley 924 F. Supp. at 1188 (concluding that doctor's letters regard-
ing plaintiffs asthmatic condition are "simply too sketchy and incomplete" to cre-
ate record of disability under ADA), with Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp.
808, 815 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (acknowledging that plaintiffs hospitalization sufficed
to establish record of impairment).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (defining disability under ADA). For exam-
ple, an individual may experience a substantially limiting episode of major depres-
sion from which he or she recovers completely. Another individual may recover
from such an episode only partially, but enough that his or her depression is no
longer substantially limiting. Both of these individuals would have a record of a
substantially limiting impairment-major depression.
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stantially limiting psychiatric impairment, which is often shown in
school or hospital records. 52
This prong of the definition may be implicated in ,any number
of circumstances and need not involve the employer coming into
possession of a written record of disability.5 3 For example, an em-
ployer may learn that an individual had a prolonged episode of ma-
jor depression when the individual discloses that he or she was only
able to obtain a conditional state certification to practice their cho-
sen health care field (such as respiratory therapy). In such a case,
the employer would be aware that the employee had a record of a
disability, major depression. Similarly, if the employer learns that
an employee had used a medication widely associated with a psychi-
atric disability, such as lithium carbonate, or had a psychiatric hos-
pitalization in the past, there is a strong argument that the
employer again would be aware of a record of psychiatric disability.
In these instances, the records of medication and of hospitalization
are so closely associated with psychiatric disability that they can sub-
stitute for an express statement about psychiatric disability.
IV. REGARDED AS HAVING A SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING IMPAIRMENT
The "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability is in-
tended to combat discrimination based on myths, fears and stereo-
types about disabilities that may come into play even when a person
does not actually have a disability.54 Given the high level of fear
and discomfort in American society about psychiatric disorders in
general, 55 this aspect of the definition is especially relevant when it
comes to protecting individuals with mental disorders from
discrimination.
People who are the target of employment discrimination based
on genetic information are protected under the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA's definition of disability.56 There is increasing
52. See id. For example, an individual may have been misdiagnosed during a
hospitalization many years ago as having schizophrenia. ,
53. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Southern Co. Serv., 92 F.3d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir.
1996) (finding fact that plaintiff was placed on paid disability'leave, followed by
unpaid disability leave, was evidence of record of being impaired).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 12012(2)(B) (defining disability under ADA); H.R. ReP.
No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 452-53.
55. For a discussion of the present stigma surrounding psychological disabili-
ties, see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
56. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.8 (stating that "regarded as"
part of definition of disability applies to individuals subjected to discrimination
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evidence that severe mental illnesses, like bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia, are linked to genetic factors. 57 As the ability to ob-
tain such genetic information increases and the public becomes
more aware of this genetic link from media reports, the potential
for employment discrimination on this basis also becomes greater.
For example, suppose an employer were to learn, through inquiries
and medical examinations after an offer had been made, that an
individual carried a genetic marker that made the individual vul-
nerable to schizophrenia. The employer subsequently withdraws its
offer of employment to this individual based on its concerns about
escalating health insurance costs, attendance and behavior
problems, and litigation. Because this employer is treating this in-
dividual as if he or she in fact had a substantially limiting mental
impairment, the individual has a disability for purposes of the
ADA.58
Individuals who are the target of employment discrimination
because they have an impairment that is not substantially limiting,
but is perceived by the employer as substantially limiting, are also
covered by this prong of the definition of disability.59 Thus, an
individual would have a disability under this prong if he or she were
denied high visibility "fast-track" assignments because the employer
expressed doubts about his or her ability to work under stress and
make complex decisions after learning that he or she was receiving
therapy for mild depression. In this example, the employee is not
substantially limited by mild depression, but the employer regards
the employee as substantially limited in the ability to think and
concentrate.
57. See OTA DISABILrry REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
58. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 6, § 902.8 ("Covered entities that dis-
criminate against individuals on the basis of... genetic information are regarding
the individual as having impairments that substantially limit a major lif activity.");
see also Wagner v. Kester Solder Co., No. 94 C 6039, 1995 WL 399484, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. June 28, 1995) (stating that "regarded as" prong "disabuse[s] people of myths
about the disabled and prohibit[s] discrimination against those with an impair-
ment that does not substantially limit major life activities"). See generally Olson v.
General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 953 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding genuine issue
of material fact exists on whether defendant regarded plaintiff as having disabil-
ity); Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 805 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (alleg-
ing disability under ADA because employer regarded plaintiff as having
impairment substantially limiting major life activity); Marschand v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (stating test for "substantially
limited in working" to be "whether the impairment, as perceived, would affect the
individual's ability to find work across the spectrum of same or similar jobs").
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1997) (stating that if individual has impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activity, but is treated as such, then indi-
vidual is regarded as having such impairment).
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In other "regarded as" cases involving psychiatric issues, the in-
dividual may supply an employer with ambiguous documentation of
mental health problems, suggesting the possibility of a mental im-
pairment, but not necessarily substantial limitation. If the employer
takes an adverse employment action based on this information, the
action would be considered as regarding the individual as disabled.
The employer also may come into possession of such information
from other sources, such as from former colleagues or rumors. In
some situations, the employer may then call the employee for a
conference, inquire about his or her personal "problems," state that
upper management views his or her behavior as overly emotional
and unacceptable, and strongly encourage the employee to seek
counseling through the company's "Employee Assistance Plan."
Under these facts, there may be a factual issue whether manage-
ment regarded this individual as having a substantially limiting
impairment. 60
This prong of the definition of disability also extends to indi-
viduals who have no impairment at all, but who are "perceived" by
the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. Thus,
for example, this prong would cover a salesperson whose employ-
ment was terminated after the employer, upon learning that the
employee obtained counseling, stated that "people who get therapy
can't do sales." While this individual does not have a mental im-
pairment-getting counseling is not evidence of a mental impair-
ment here-the employer is assuming that counseling is associated
with an impairment and that the impairment is so severe that the
employee is substantially limited in working all sales jobs. This em-
ployer is regarding the employee as having a mental impairment
that substantially limits his or her ability to interact with others or to
work.
60. See Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 363 (9th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether employer regarded
employee as having mental disability where employer met with him to discuss "ab-
errational behavior," asked him if he had problems and encouraged him to seek
counseling). But see Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 111-12 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding that deputy sheriff was not regarded as having disability where sher-
iff thought him excitable, psychologically unbalanced and temperamentally unfit
and ordered psychological evaluations of him); Johnson v. Boardman Petroleum,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that store district supervisor
was not regarded as having mental disability where manager told her to seek pro-
fessional help, required release from doctor to return to work and told her at
termination that she was physically and mentally incapable of continuing job).
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V. CONCLUSION
The ADA is a powerful tool for combating discrimination
against individuals with psychiatric disabilities because it protects
people currently suffering from such conditions, in addition to
those with records of severe psychiatric conditions or those who are
regarded as having such conditions. Finding that an individual who
currently has a psychiatric condition is disabled within the meaning
of the ADA is, in many cases, a straightforward exercise because of
the serious and ongoing nature of the severe mental disorders. In
other instances, such as when an employer knows about an individ-
ual's past psychiatric hospitalization, it is similarly clear that the in-
dividual is covered by the ADA by virtue of his or her record. When
more complex analysis is required, it can be achieved by following
the familiar case-by-case, functional framework for assessing ADA
disability and by moving beyond preconceptions to objective facts.
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